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ABSTRACT
Fight the Power: Protest, Showdown and
Civil Rights Activity in Three Southern
Cities, 1960-1965
by
Kyle T. Scanlan
This thesis describes the significant events of the Civil
Rights Movement from 1960 to 1965, examining the campaigns
of Albany, Georgia in 1962, Birmingham, Alabama in 1963, and
Selma, Alabama in 1965. In the wake of the Freedom Rides of
1960-61, Martin Luther King’s Southern Christian Leadership
Conference was looking for a way to dramatically reveal the
racial injustice of the South. Stumbling into a campaign in
Albany, SCLC found the right method in the use of nonviolent
direct action. While Albany was a failure, it was this
campaign that led to the campaigns of Birmingham and Selma,
which resulted in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Through
confrontation with law enforcement, SCLC was able to effect
meaningful social change.
The research for this thesis included both primary and
secondary sources. Newspaper accounts, especially from the
New York Times, were used as well as magazine articles. All
three main chapters contain accounts by the participants,
activists, and politicians.
The conclusion from the research would indicate that it was
through the use of confrontation with Southern law
enforcement that the Civil Rights Movement was able to force
the federal government act on civil rights legislation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Civil Rights Movement in the United States
essentially began the same time that the country did.
Beginning with the Abolitionist movement to end the
“peculiar institution” of slavery, through the Civil War and
Reconstruction, and into the Industrial Age, the United
States has always grappled with the problem of race. In his
1903 classic study on race relations, The Souls of Black
Folk, Dr. W.E.B. DuBois wrote that, “the problem of the
Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line.”1
DuBois was not far off in his assessment. During this
century race had become the number one social ill in the
nation. It was disguised as class struggles, economic woes,
wars and manifested itself in other forms.
There were many valiant attempts during the Twentieth
Century to improve the state of race relations, but all of
them were doomed to minimal success. DuBois and Booker T.
Washington were both great leaders, but their squabbling
over methods and ideology derailed many of their best

1

WEB DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk (Chicago: A.C.
McClurge and Co., 1903), xi.
6

efforts. Marcus Garvey, the flamboyant leader of the UNIA
(United Negro Improvement Association), had one of the
largest followings of any Black leaders in the history of
the United States, but rampant corruption within his
organization coupled with the chronic investigations and his
eventual imprisonment by the federal government ended his
career. All of these leaders were unable to see their goals
reach fruition. Decades would pass before the desolate
plight of Black Americans would etch itself into American
society.
In the 1950s, a series of several victories in the
courts engineered by Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund culminated in the 1954 Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka decision seemed to open the floodgates
for change.2 The case, which struck down the 1896 precedent
of “separate but equal”, established in the case of Plessy
v. Ferguson3 marked the beginning of the erosion of
entrenched systematized segregation. This decision was
really the beginning of the modern Civil Rights Movement,
marked with effective protest and actual results. Harry

2

347 U.S. (1954).

3

163 U.S. (1896).
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Ashmore went as far as to say, “without the Brown decision,
there would have been no Civil Rights Movement.”4
The Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955-56 was one of the
earliest events in the modern Civil Rights Movement. Under
the leadership of MIA (Montgomery Improvement Association)
President Martin Luther King Jr. Blacks used the nonviolent
resistance technique of a mass boycott on the city bus
system. After a protracted campaign, the Montgomery
Improvement Association forced the end of segregation on
public transit in the city. King, who was quite interested
in social justice and equality, saw that he had the model
for bringing about the end of Jim Crow in the South.
Meanwhile in Little Rock, tensions were building in
1957 as Arkansas attempted to comply with the Brown
decision. That fall, as the plan of integration was being
carried out, violence erupted. President Eisenhower was
forced to federalize the Arkansas National Guard and call in
regular US Army troops to allow nine teenage children the
right to attend school. Due to the shorter time span of
events and the confrontational spectacle that erupted, this
made for greater public exposure for television cameras. It

4

Harry Ashmore, Civil Rights and Wrongs: A Memoir of Race
and Politics, 1944-1994, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994),
96.
8

was Little Rock that first placed the burgeoning Civil
Rights Movement dramatically into the nation’s living rooms,
and it was this campaign that gave King an education on how
to manipulate the modern media to aid his efforts.
With the arrival of television, King saw that his
philosophy of nonviolent resistance had a natural ally. The
point of nonviolence is to protest injustice and oppression
while at the same time rising above the temptation to
uselessly fight back violently in a battle that cannot be
won. With the aid of television, King hoped to build on the
lessons of Montgomery and Little Rock and use nonviolent
resistance tactics to educate the nation to the racial
injustice that was rampant in the South. Then, with the
nation suitably outraged, the government would be forced
into protecting the rights of Black Americans. Vilifying
local Southern authority as the bad guys on television would
allow victory for the movement.
The years from 1960 to 1965 were the high water mark of
the modern Civil Rights Movement. Under the leadership of
Dr. King’s organization, SCLC, (the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference), the Movement managed to change the
nation.

9

In 1962 in Albany, Georgia, SCLC and SNCC (the Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) attempted to wage the
first large scale campaign to secure integration of public
facilities and voting rights in the city. Here, the Movement
was met with defeat due to the skillful, yet, retograde
intelligence of Sheriff Laurie Prichett. Prichett was well
schooled in the methods of Martin Luther King and was well
aware of King’s use of Gandhian tactics. The Albany Sheriff
knew what the campaign was designed to do, provoke him and
his men into violence, thus Prichett used nonviolence to
combat nonviolence, therefore, stymieing the efforts of King
and his supporters.
King knew that in the wake of failure at Albany, the
Movement needed to do something profound in 1963. Little
could he have dreamed that it was the events of that year
that would result in Congress passing the following year
meaningful civil rights legislation for the first time since
Reconstruction. In 1963, SCLC decided to implement a
campaign in Birmingham, Alabama. Here they met their desired
result, as police chief Bull Connor reacted in the manner
SCLC anticipated. The mass arrests of protesters were
accompanied by the use of fire hoses and police dogs, and
the nation watched the coverage on television, stunned.

10

Violence got so bad that President Kennedy was forced to
station troops in various parts of the state to be used if
the situation did not calm down. By the summer of 1963, with
Kennedy’s Civil Rights Bill on the floor of Congress, civil
rights organizations staged the March on Washington to apply
pressure to the government. With 250,000 marchers standing
in front of the Lincoln Memorial, King gave his legendary “I
Have a Dream” speech.
That September, tragedy once again occurred in
Birmingham, as a bomb killed four Black girls at the 16th
Street Baptist Church. Violence erupted, and by the end of
the day six people were dead. In November 1963 John F.
Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas and Lyndon Johnson became
President. Johnson’s legislative skills aided in passing
Kennedy’s bill, and in 1964, President Johnson signed into
law the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5
On the heels of a victory in Birmingham, King’s next
focus was voting rights. While launching the statewide
Alabama Project, SCLC decided to stage a campaign in Selma,
Alabama. Dallas County Sheriff Jim Clark harbored many of
the racist values of Bull Connor, and once again SCLC
planned on exposing the violence of the police to
demonstrate the evils of Jim Crow. In this campaign, the

11

movement was emphasizing the injustice of being deprived of
the right to vote. The campaign went smoothly until March 7,
1965. While beginning a planned march to the state capital,
the marchers were routed by police with tear gas, cattle
prods, and billy clubs. “Bloody Sunday” was the turning
point. The march went on, and as President Johnson was
forced to get involved, he decided that the time was now
right to force a voting rights bill through Congress. His
Administration had been stalling on sending more civil
rights legislation to Congress, but Johnson decided that
King had given him a perfect opportunity to pass a voting
rights bill. The President turned out to be correct, and on
August 6, 1965, Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act of
1965.6
These events changed the lives of all Americans. Due to
the combination of good leadership, determination,
influence, as well as intense coverage by the media,
segregation faced a severe setback in the American South.

5
6

377 U.S.(1964).
437 U.S.(1965).
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CHAPTER 2
ONE SHREWD, YET RETROGRADE SHERIFF

Martin Luther King, Jr. formed the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC) in 1957 in the hope that the
future that held the dissolution of racial equality.1 Dr.
King, fresh off the victory of the Montgomery Bus Boycott,
had an ultimate objective, racial justice, and he had a
refined method of nonviolent resistance that he intended to
employ. However, what King lacked was a specific area in
which to implement these plans. In 1961, with the ever
increasing idealism sweeping the nation with the
inauguration of John F. Kennedy, the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) was organized, and it was with
this young, energetic group that an explicit plan of attack
against segregation came to fruition. The use of sit-ins,
boycotts, voter registration drives, and freedom marches
were all planned and organized.2 Forced to capture the
attention of young people, SCLC was looking for something to
captivate the nation as Montgomery had done.

1

Andrew Young, An Easy Burden: the Civil Rights Movement
and the Transformation of America (New York: Harper Collins:
1996), 1.
2

James Forman, The Making of Black Revolutionaries
(Seattle: Open Hand Publishing, 1985), 145.
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At this point, the movement turned its attention
towards Albany, a small town in southwest Georgia with great
racial diversity and deeply rooted racist sentiments. SNCC
had agreed to send two activists, Charles Sherrod and
Cordell Reagon, into Terrell County, where Albany was
located, to begin organizing the black community through
voter registration. Many activists viewed Terrell County as
the most stagnant and formidable county in the South. The
Black community was terrified of economic retribution by the
White community, and the White community was comforted by
the considerable financial advantage they held over the
Blacks.
Terrell County was located in one of the most
unfavorable areas for African Americans in the United
States. The names the activists had associated with the
counties in Southwest Georgia told the story: “Dogging
Douglas”, “Unmitigated Mitchell”, “Lamentable Lee”,
“Unbearable Baker”, and “Unworthy Worth”.3
Dr. King and SCLC did not organize the Albany campaign
and they were never in control of the demonstrations. They
were invited to Albany by SNCC. They arrived on the scene to
find a Black community that was largely inactive in the

3

Forman, The Making of Black Revolutionaries, 248.
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context of the Movement. It was said that, “even the local
NAACP was quiet until the 1961 Interstate Commerce decree
ordering integration of buses and depots.”4 Tension in the
city culminated when the two young SNCC workers, Cordell
Reagon and Charles Sherrod, arrived in Albany in October of
1961 to prepare for the voter registration campaign. The two
field workers received very little support from the black
community.5 Many people, including ministers, felt that if
they allowed the activists into their homes, it would
endanger themselves and their families by provoking white
supremacist reaction. After a month, both men had generally
won the community over, but there was still a small degree
of bitterness towards the “outsiders.”6
It came as no surprise that when SNCC sent Sherrod and
Reagon to the hot, southwest corner of Georgia the two of
them encountered a formidable task: Albany. In his seminal
work on race relations The Souls of Black Folk, DuBois
presented a portrait of the landscape, “ For a radius of a
hundred miles about Albany stretch a great, fertile land,

4

Thomas Peake, Keeping the Dream Alive (New York: Peter
Lang Publishing, 1987), 88.
5

Jim Bishop, The Days of Martin Luther King (New York: GP
Putnam and Sons, 1971), 248.
6

Peake, Keeping the Dream Alive, 88.
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luxuriant with forests of pine, oak, ash, hickory, and
poplar, hot with the sun and damp from the rich swampland;
and here the cornerstone of the cotton kingdom was laid.”7
The most effective tool that the segregationists had in
their arsenal was fear. If the black community feared
unwarranted violence from the police, they would remain
quiet. If the black community feared the unpunished
vigilante beatings or lynching by incensed mobs, they would
remain quiet. If the black community was afraid of
disturbing the normalcy of centuries of segregation, they
would remain quiet. But several factors, World War II,
television, and the deep, seething resentment within the
black community were aspiring to overturn the prevailing
social order, and the time was ripe for change.
In early October of 1961, Reagon and Sherrod moved into
Albany and set up office in a small, rundown building two
blocks from the Mt. Zion Baptist Church and the Shiloh
Baptist Church, in a section of town known as Harlem.8 Their
initial task was to register voters. Albany consisted of a
large black population that had swelled to 40 percent by

7

WEB DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk (Chicago: A.C.
McClurge and Co., 1903), 143.

8

Fred Powledge, Free at Last (Boston: Little, Brown, and
Co., 1991), 341.
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1962, but its influence in the community was greatly
lacking. Terrell was a county with about 11,500
people, and about 60 percent of those were black people, yet
only 52 black citizens were registered to vote9, a
staggering indication of the powerful intimidation that had
been ingrained within the Black community.
SCLC believed that much of the respect and influence in
the black community fell to the local ministers, and if they
could recruit and mobilize these men, much of the community
would follow their example. SNCC, however, had a decidedly
different strategy. Their aim was to recruit as many young
people as possible. Their thinking was that if they managed
to engage the young people, the older citizens would become
involved to protect their children and maintain the respect
their children had for them.10
On the first day of November 1961, the Interstate
Commerce Commission issued a regulation outlawing
segregation in interstate transport terminals. Within a
short time, Sherrod and Reagon had convinced college
students from Albany State College to sit-in at White bus

9

John Ansboro, The Making of a Mind (New York: Orbis Books,
1982), 82.

10

Aldon Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement,
(New York: The Free Press, 1984), 240.
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terminals and as SNCC hoped, the entire community solidified
around the efforts of their children. This raised the ire of
the NAACP, because the students recruited by SNCC largely
belonged to the NAACP Youth Council of Albany. The more
austere organization was worried both about its reputation
and a concern that SNCC, a relatively untested organization,
would end up getting the children sent to jail, and the
NAACP would end up footing the bill to have them freed.
However, the energy of the movement was capturing the
imagination of the people in Albany. In an effort to avoid
internecine warfare among the civil rights organizations, on
November 17, 1961, the Ministerial Alliance, the Federation
of Women’s Clubs, the Negro Voters League, the Criterion
Club, the NAACP as well as SNCC decided to come together
under an inclusive name: the Albany Movement.11 Dr. William
Anderson, a respected medical doctor who had not lived in
the community long enough to make enemies and had precious
little experience in organized civil rights work, was
elected president of the Albany Movement.12
The Albany Movement was unique in many ways. Most

11

David Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King and
the SCLC (New York: Morrow and Co, 1986), 176.
12

Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement, 241.

18

importantly, the goals of the movement differed
drastically from the previous movements. Instead of
concentrating on a single goal, it was decided that this
movement would end all forms of racial discrimination in
Albany, Georgia. Demonstrations would be held against
segregated buses, libraries, bowling alleys, restaurants,
swimming pools, and other facilities.13 Somehow, through all
of this, the SNCC recruiters had conveyed to the people that
it was no longer disgraceful to go to jail if it was for a
noble and just cause. Slowly, the timidity of the black
community was dissolving, and they began to fight for their
convictions, even if it meant they were going to jail for
them. Never before would such a large number of people have
gone to jail in Albany. It would appear that some sort of
boiling point was imminent.14
A few weeks after the initial confrontation in the
terminal, on November 22, five Albany State students went to
eat inside the Trailways station to test the ICC ruling.
Unfortunately for the students, they were the first in the
Albany Movement to confront the city’s sheriff, Laurie
Prichett. Commenting on the eventual arrests, Prichett

13

Morris, 241.

14

Ibid., 242.
19

pointed out that the five students were cited for failing to
obey the orders of a law enforcement officer, a city
ordinance, and that the incident had nothing to do with
interstate commerce.15 This was not a foreseen development.
Prichett was not the stereotypical southern sheriff. He was
35, an Elk, Shriner, Rotarian, and a Mason. He did not use
the word “nigger” in public as did many of his
contemporaries, and he refrained from using tobacco in
public or engaging in any other stereotypical activity that
would characterize him as an ignorant southerner. He was
primarily interested in doing his job fairly and enforcing
the laws of Albany and the State of Georgia.16 These traits
would later serve him well as the national press focused on
the showdown in Albany months later.
Prichett had done his homework. He read nonviolent
theory and practice, especially those tactics used by SNCC
and SCLC. He knew that King’s brand of nonviolence was
derived from the protest philosophies of Gandhi and
Thoreau,17 and he was aware of the fact that Sherrod and

15

Juan Williams, Eyes on the Prize:America’s Civil Rights
Years 1954-1965.(New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 167
16

Powledge, 353.

17

Peake, 91.
20

Reagon were circulating certain ideas of Thoreau among the
people. Thoreau said that the only place for a just and
principled man was jail, and if one person would stand
against the wrongs of the establishment, then the entire
regime was doomed to fail, inevitably.18
As the champion of liberation for the people of India,
Gandhi, in combination with Thoreau and others, provided a
basic philosophical framework for Dr. King to infuse his own
ideas to combat Jim Crow in the south. King agreed with
Gandhi that the result of an effort did not justify the
action taken to achieve that result.19 Later, in his “Letter
From Birmingham Jail”, King argued that Sheriff Prichett had
used nonviolent tactics to maintain an immoral injustice,
and that such action was worse than the naked hatred of Bull
Connor.
By this time, King had nearly perfected his
implementation of passive resistance. He demanded that all
protest be completely peaceful and that his activists
conduct themselves in a loving manner with integrity. As a
result, when Sheriff Prichett began to counteract

18

Henry David Thoreau. Civil Disobedience (New York:
Penguin Books, 1985), 56.
19

Peake, 16.
21

nonviolence with nonviolence, the movement was not at all
certain how to respond.
Prichett was well prepared. He knew how Dr. King
thought and made a few simple realizations. By studying the
thought and method of such men as Thoreau, Gandhi, King, and
Tolstoy, Prichett realized that nonviolence was most
effective when there was violence for it to play off of.
This was especially true in the Civil Rights Movement, which
used this confrontational strategy especially well for
television, where the brutality was on display for all to
see. Prichett saw that he could render nonviolence useless
by combating it forcefully, with nonviolence. And so, when
those five students were arrested on November 25, 1961,
Prichett was there personally and took them into custody
politely and without malice.20 Almost immediately, SNCC saw
that they were in for a different kind of campaign and were
not sure how to respond.
Sheriff Prichett had sensed the growing hostility
between the White and Black communities and in response he
had retrained his police force accordingly. He visited
places that had already felt the impact of the movement,
like Little Rock, and had asked questions in light of his

20

Peake,90.
22

own understanding of passive resistance. According to a 1962
issue of US News and World Report, Prichett, “held daily
classes in how to handle demonstrators without force or
violence. He hammered home the idea that physical contact
should be avoided, no police dogs used, no tear gas fired or
nightsticks swung-except in extreme cases.”21
Prichett’s main intention was keeping the peace. Any
sign of disturbance was very alarming to him, and it seemed
that all other considerations became secondary if the calm
of the community was in jeopardy. But as James Forman noted,
“Peace and quiet meant maintaining segregation and
oppression.”22 On a few occasions Prichett dealt firmly with
whites who threatened trouble. During the campaign a group
of Ku Klux Klan members checked into an Albany hotel for
unspecified reasons. He brought the men into his office and
expressed concern over any violence that might break out.
Prichett threatened to arrest them if they acted unwisely or
even visited certain parts of town, especially Harlem.23
After the arrest of the five students, the SNCC
workers’ next move was to organize a large protest
21

“Now it’s Passive Resistance by Whites-The Albany, GA
Plan” US News and World Report 3 September 1962, 46.
22

Forman, 253.

23

“Keep Walking” Newsweek. 13 August 1962, 18.
23

demonstration among a group of high school students, as well
as holding several nonviolence workshops.24 All of the
forces were in place and the attack on Jim Crow in Albany
was about to begin in earnest. On November 25, the Albany
Movement held its first mass meeting, singing spirituals and
listening to testimonials from the five students who had
been arrested. More importantly, the anger over the arrests
had mended the rift between the NAACP and SNCC.
On November 27, the five students were tried, and a
mass rally was held on the sidewalk outside the courthouse.
The south was stunned. After generations of apathy, Albany’s
blacks engaged in a massive nonviolent protest that rocked
the community, disrupting civil order for almost a year.
This was perhaps the largest community protest since the bus
boycott in Montgomery about five years earlier.
Consequently, the intensity and ostensible unity in the
Movement brought much national attention, from front-page
headlines, to a future Nobel Peace Prize for King, to
concern and action from the White House.
As the protesters continued to demonstrate in bus
stations and lunch counters, Prichett continued to make
arrests and effectively obstructed the activists’ movements.
24

Hanes Walton Jr., The Political Philosophy of Martin
Luther King (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1971), 128.
24

On December 10, ten Freedom Riders rode into Albany
from Atlanta via-integrated train. As they disembarked and
attempted to integrate the train station, eight of them were
arrested for trespassing.25 After matter-of-factly arresting
SCLC Youth Director Bernard Lee and SNCC militant James
Forman, two of the eight activists involved, Prichett
commented, “We will not stand for these troublemakers coming
into our city for the sole purpose of disturbing the peace
and quiet of the city of Albany.”26 As the demonstrations
and massive arrests continued without tangible result, a
sort of paranoia descended upon Albany. However, the arrests
of the Freedom Riders did bring the national press to Albany
to monitor the situation. The next day, Forman, just
released from jail, led a march of 267 Black students to the
train station. All of them were arrested and, true to SNCC’s
avowed tactics, refused bail.27 Two days later, Slater King,
Vice-President of the Albany Movement, led 200 protesters to
city hall. Predictably, all 200 were soon on their way to
jail, arrested for parading without a permit.28
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Williams, Eyes on the Prize, 167.
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Morris, 242.
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Williams, 168.
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Ibid., 168.
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Jails brimmed with activists. Many citizens were afraid
of being caught up in all of the disturbances and the
streets were virtually empty. Commerce in the town was in
dire straits as a result. Dr. Anderson observed that,
“Albany was literally paralyzed for about a month. Nobody
went into the town to shop, black or white. They never knew
when another mass demonstration was going to break out, and
no one knew if there was going to be a shooting war.”29
Hundreds of blacks were stuck in jail, some in terribly
overcrowded conditions. In a single cell designed for six
inmates, fifty-four girls were left to arrange themselves as
best they could.30 No one was happy with the state of
affairs. The White community was incensed at the Black
community because they were disturbing the serenity of the
long-quiet town. However, the Black community drew on their
own strength under the movement’s leadership.
Consequently, in mid-December, the city agreed to hold
an unofficial conference with the Albany Movement to see if
they could make some sort of “arrangement”, but the two
groups reached an impasse. The leaders of the Movement had
very little leverage, and they were left without a
29

Stephen Oates, Let The Trumpet Sound. (New York: Penguin
Books,1982), 182.
30

Oates, Let the Trumpet Sound. 183.
26

resolution in the face of intransigent Albany officials. Dr.
Anderson feared that the activists would quickly grow
discouraged, and the Albany Movement would be dissolved if
something was not done to reinvigorate the people.31
Anderson believed that SNCC had provided what was needed, a
stimulus, but once the movement got going it did not have
the resources for such a massive undertaking.32
And so, despite the pleas of some of the SNCC workers,
Dr. Anderson placed a phone call to Atlanta and asked former
classmate Martin Luther King to come to Albany. James Forman
was particularly against this, remarking that, “…it was
important to keep the Albany Movement a people’s
movement…and the presence of Dr. King would detract from
this focus.”33 SNCC believed that because the media had
already converged on the events in Albany, the attention
King would bring would be obtrusive and unnecessary. They
thought that the strength of the people would carry them
through and did not need a “messiah” figure to assume
control.
Until now, King had been watching the events unfold
from SCLC headquarters in Atlanta. The campaign, however,
31

Morris, 243.

32

Ibid., 244.

27

was failing because of the difficulty in unifying a movement
with so many leaders.34 King had no intention of getting
permanently involved at Albany (he did not even bring a
toothbrush), but he agreed to come and make an appearance.
He had always commented on filling the jails of the South,
and this seemed like an appropriate time for him to get
involved. However, there was discontent among the rank and
file that after all of their hard work and sacrifice, King
would show up and pull off a “miracle.” According to one
Black citizen, “Mr. King is not quite the Moses to lead us
out of our troubles.”35 Dissenting opinions from certain
segments of the Black community only further complicated an
already precarious situation, and conflicts deepened as the
Albany Movement seemed headed for a collapse.
King, however, came through and managed to give one of
his best speeches at the Shiloh Baptist Church upon his
arrival. His words from that message are well known and
would be repeated countless times. “We shall overcome. Don’t
stop now. Keep moving. Don’t get weary children. We will
wear them down by our capacity to suffer.”36 But his words
33
34

Forman, 255.
Peake, 91.

35

“Now it’s Passive Resistance” US News and World Report. 3
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36
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came to no effect until later, for the Albany campaign was
doomed to fall short.
Despite all of the obstacles faced by King, SNCC, and
SCLC and the integration activists having to contend with in
the austere racism of the white community and the latent law
enforcement of tactics of Chief Prichett, they had yet to
contend with their most malicious foe: James Grey, of the
Albany Herald. Albany was a place that did not concern
itself with the outside world, and, as a result, was a place
that was highly conducive for someone of white supremacist
thought like Grey. His favorite journalistic “technique” was
to fashion stories that depicted blacks as a highly ignorant
and inferior people.
Grey never attempted to be impartial in his
journalistic approach. Belittling, demeaning, or undermining
the goals of the activists, Grey constantly manipulated the
people of Albany and reinforced the community mores with his
own racist thoughts.37 According to Newsweek, “Grey has
fulfilled the traditional role of editor-as-community-leader
by simply giving his readers what they want-a viewpoint
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insulated against the fires of social change, stubbornly
conservative, rigidly segregationist.”38
Grey gave himself away as he attempted to relay the
arrest of Dr. King and others in September of 1962: “Crowd
Cheers as Cops Clap Clerical Crowd in Calaboose.” In the
accompanying article, Grey claimed, “The racial problem in
Albany has been overemphasized. It’s not a real story.”39
The brazen and offensive journalism produced by Grey
probably would not have been such a disturbance if it was
not consumed and confirmed by the white community. One man
was quoted as saying, “The Herald reflects the attitudes in
Albany. If the Paper says a chicken dips snuff, you can lift
up it’s [sic] right wing and find a box there.”40
Dr. King seeing the urgency of the situation, decided
to stay, declaring, “We will plague this community with all
of our determination…I will be in Albany until next January
if these problems aren’t solved.”41 A few days later on
December 16, King was jailed with 250 other protesters and
promised to spend Christmas in jail unless the movement’s
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demands were met. However, the city took away this strategy
by concocting a strange technicality that allowed his
release and foiled his plans, deflating any momentum that
his imprisonment might have established.42 Albany refused to
blatantly confront the campaigners with any degree of
finality unless they exhibited some degree of rowdy
behavior that posed a threat to the townspeople. Because the
philosophy of the protesters was similar, a stalemate was
inevitable.43
So King continued the demonstrations into the spring,
until he and several other of the leaders, and two hundred
protesters, were tried and convicted for the December march,
and once again, they promised to stay in jail until the
situation was resolved.44 But once again, Prichett outwitted
them. He forced them out of jail, saying, “An unidentified,
well-dressed black man had paid their bail.”45 King had once
said that Laurie Prichett was the finest police chief he had
met in the south, and it seems that a sense of mutual
respect had developed between the two men. However, King
42
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realized that Prichett was not genuinely concerned with
justice, and he felt hurt and betrayed.
King agreed to leave jail upon the condition that the
city officials would return all of the bond money, release
all of the jailed protesters on their own recognizance,
postpone the trials of the protesters indefinitely,
desegregate the busses immediately, and finally, establish a
permanent biracial committee to work out the details of
desegregating the city.46 Within days, it became clear that
the city would uphold none of these promises, and King felt
that he had not kept his own promise and should have stayed
in jail.
The final nonviolent showdown came on the night of July
24, after nearly six months of inactivity during
negotiations between the city and the Albany Movement. That
night, nearly 3,000 blacks gathered in the street and began
marching towards the center of town. One hundred sixty
officers met the wave of protesters, and true to form,
Prichett asked King if the marchers had a demonstration
permit. Dr. King said no, and the mass arrests began to
incur yet again. However, on that night, out of months of
frustration, some of the marchers began to throw rocks and
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other objects at the police.47 “But not one of my men ever
lifted his nightstick from his belt,” Prichett reported with
pride, even joking about the “nonviolent rocks”. “We broke
the backs of the lawbreakers that night. The black’s
nonviolent movement became violent, and when that happened,
the Negroes lost a lot of sympathizers-here and in other
places.”48 And it was true, the tide had turned and the hope
for victory in Albany was lost. King was arrested yet again,
and was released August 10, upon intervention from the
Justice Department.
King returned to Atlanta, intending to rest and allow
the local leadership to continue negotiations with the city.
However, even after he departed, city leaders refused to
meet with officials from the Albany Movement. The city
fathers claimed that they wanted, “a new and responsible
voice for the colored citizens of Albany.”49 On August 15,
King returned to Albany, and local leaders finally got to
meet with the mayor. No agreement could be reached, and all
the Movement leaders could do was hold a press conference. A
few days later, King left Albany. But while he was gone, Dr.
47
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Anderson called a halt to all activity in the Albany area.
The situation was now resolved in favor of racial injustice.
King was disgusted over the way the last demonstration had
gone, so much so that he gave serious consideration to
quitting the movement.50
After King departed, 75 northern protesters came to
Albany Labor Day weekend to show support for the Albany
Movement. Prichett gave the new arrivals no better treatment
than King received, arresting all of them, while admonishing
them, “Go back to your homes. Clear your own cities of sin
and lawlessness.”51
The meetings in Albany continued for another six years.
In that respect SNCC could claim a partial victory. Albany
was an important lesson in how to organize a community
during sustained protest efforts. SNCC would have great
success applying the lessons learned in Albany in
Mississippi during Freedom Summer two years later.
After some rest and a reflection on the lessons
learned in Albany, King resumed his work. Looking back at
the campaign, he remarked that the purposes of the campaign
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had been. “so vague that we got nothing and people were left
depressed and in despair.”52
The shortcomings of the Albany Movement were readily
apparent. The dissension between SNCC and the SCLC robbed
the movement of its cohesion and the unity of the people.
Communication between the two organizations became better in
the years ahead to avoid this issue, although differences
would always be there between the two organizations. Many in
SNCC thought also that King’s conservatism was to blame,
that is, he was only willing to go so far in his measures
and goals. Moreover, there was a lingering resentment in
SNCC of the publicity King could generate just by arriving
in a town and calling a press conference. In moments of
derision, SNCC staffers referred to King as “de lawd”
because he seemed to be the sole figure in the movement who
was listened to and given any media exposure.53
Little preparation had gone into Albany, a problem that
would be rectified in the later struggles, especially in
Birmingham and Selma. The goals in Albany were not always
clear, and it was never certain what concrete demands were
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behind the protests. In the future, the movement always knew
to demand specific concessions. This served a twofold
purpose. One, it kept the issues surrounding the campaign
from being confused. Also, if the campaign went to the
federal courts with a petition, one overriding issue, such
as desegregation of public facilities or voting rights, the
chances of victory were much improved.
Another contributing factor to the failure of Albany
was the lack of intervention from the Kennedy
Administration. While Kennedy was sympathetic towards the
movement, at this time there was no real incentive for the
administration to get involved. The public was not yet
outraged over segregation. Thanks to Laurie Prichett, King
could not have the drama that made news and allowed for the
power of television to graphically demonstrate the evils of
racism.
The final blow to the Albany campaign came with the
failure to act out nonviolence fully. Typically violence on
the part of the white southerners was the catalyst for
success. Sympathies were obtained and indifference exploded
when officials used violence to try and control the black
community. When these images were focused on television
every night, the entire nation took an interest in the
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movement. However, when racist whites were able to derive
sympathy in the wake of black violence, the Movement lost a
lot of credibility. SCLC took pains to see that that would
never happen again.
Although Albany was considered a failure, many
important lessons for later campaigns were learned. From
then on, the SCLC targeted only places where adversity and
violence would work for them. Also, focusing on a specific
agenda would be important. In Albany, the Movement was
probably asking for too much, and so the goals of the
protesters were somewhat muddied and confusing. This was
also rectified in later campaigns.
Albany pointed the way, and King made the journey. He
led his people, through nonviolence, to a new level of life
and human dignity. King had learned his lessons, and SCLC,
in the spirit of Horatio Alger decided to go west, to
Alabama. King was confident that the city of Birmingham was
ripe for a campaign, and as 1962 drew to a close, the SCLC
began to prepare for what would be the most vivid,
memorable, and important campaign of the entire Civil Rights
Movement: Birmingham.
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CHAPTER 3
CONFRONTATION IN THE STREETS

In the wake of the failure at Albany, SCLC decided that
it needed another campaign to build back the momentum the
Movement had built before 1962. Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth
wanted the next campaign to be Birmingham. He recalled
later, “Dr. Kings’s image was slightly on the wane because
he had not projected a victory in Albany. I said, I assure
you, if you come to Birmingham, this movement can not only
gain prestige, it can really shake the country.”1 During
this time, Birmingham was a city marked by severe racism. As
King noted later, it was a city that seemed to have
forgotten the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments to the Constitution, as well as the Brown
decision.2 Blacks were discriminated against in public
facilities such as restaurants, hotels, and restrooms, and
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also in areas such as voting rights and employment
opportunities.3
Another lesson learned from Albany was the importance
of the media. Television coverage of the early 1960s began
to focus on racial demonstrations.
For a nation that had grown used to de facto
segregation in all aspects of society, television
transcended boundaries and brought the modern Civil Rights
Movement directly into the nation’s living rooms. Because of
television coverage, nonviolent demonstrators, picket lines,
brutal police response, heckling bigots, and other factors
exposed the nation to the necessity and intensity of the
movement.
When SCLC delegates met in Birmingham in September 1962
for their annual convention, entitled, “Human Rights: The
Continuing Struggle,” speakers emphasized the necessity and
the meaning of nonviolence. Guest speaker Jackie Robinson,
who carried an immense amount of respect within the Black
community as the first black man to play Major League
Baseball, among other dignitaries, urged Blacks outside the
South to become aware of the disgraceful living conditions
3
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and try to rectify them by supporting the movement.4 SCLC
Executive Director Wyatt T. Walker reported to the
convention that he spent his first full year on the job
laying out the long- range plan for SCLC, and he noted the
role of the new citizenship programs in those plans. Walker
felt that efforts in this direction would soon meet with
success.5
Although a big believer in voter registration and
training, the temperamental Walker was not a gradualist, and
he knew that SCLC needed a crisis to regain momentum and
reach a new plateau after the debacle at Albany. At that
same convention, he and other SCLC leaders were already
beginning to lay the groundwork to make Birmingham the major
campaign for 1963.
Indeed, locals had already been fearful that the SCLC
convention would bring demonstrations to the city in the
previous year, 1962. Since January, the city businesses had
been hurt by a selective boycott engineered by students at
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Miles College, but no ground had been gained till it was
announced that SCLC was gathering for its annual convention.
While Fred Shuttlesworth and the ACMHR had won victories
there before, they would always later lose the ground they
thought that they had gained. With the pressure of SCLC
coming in for the convention, Shuttlesworth’s organization
gained some concessions, but typically these were lost when
the convention was over.6
A few days after the convention, news came out of
neighboring Mississippi that a court order had been issued
to allow James Meredith to enroll at the University of
Mississippi at Oxford. King, watching the way Mississippi
governor Ross Barnett protested, wondered if George Wallace,
recently nominated candidate for governor of Alabama, might
win the office and enforce a similar program.
Actually, the SCLC was not prepared to begin a campaign
in Birmingham at that time. Albany was still going on, and
they needed more time and a lot more planning. So King set
his sights on the pre-Easter buying season in early 1963 as
his target date. King was also hopeful that if he waited,
the Kennedy Administration could act boldly and eliminate
6
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the need for confrontation. At this point, King was still
hopeful that he could force the administration to issue a
“Second Emancipation Proclamation,” because 1963 was the
centennial of the first.7 Of course, King knew that
political barriers blocked the president from taking so bold
an action, and he was unaware of the looming Cuban missile
crisis and its aftermath in October 1962 that was crowding
the rest of Kennedy’s program to the side. The uncertainty
of federal action made the need for intense preparation for
Birmingham all the more crucial.
As an industrial hub and at the time the most important
city in the south, Birmingham was replete with
possibilities. However, the city’s strict tradition of
segregation, epitomized by police commissioner Eugene “Bull”
Connor, would not make the task easy. When later asked why
King chose Birmingham then, he answered that, “… Birmingham
represented the hard core, recalcitrant, segregationist
South… with the ugly image created by the Bull Connor
philosophy of race relations…”8 Connor showed open hostility
towards Blacks in their struggle for civil rights and
7
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towards any attempt made by the federal government to aid in
that cause.9 It was this attitude that SCLC was hoping to
exploit. So, the effort in the city was a deliberately
engineered crisis intended to revitalize the movement after
the disastrous Albany campaign of 1962 and strike a blow in
the main citadel of segregation.
King’s mention of the image of Bull Connor indicated
that he was also thinking of changing tactics against the
Kennedy Administration. If he could sway public opinion with
a dramatic campaign, he could force Kennedy to move more
deliberately on the Civil Rights front. This policy came to
the forefront as events unfolded, but it is clear that when
King went to Birmingham he was looking to provide SCLC the
clout to not only make changes in that city, but to
influence national policy. If the Birmingham campaign
worked, much would obviously be accomplished. However, if it
failed, then it would at least bring the issue of
segregation before the court of world opinion and force the
federal government to act.10 While some scholars saw this as
8
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a shift in King’s thought or policy, it really was not. King
had written as early as 1958, “…the mass movement repudiates
violence while moving resolutely to its goal, its opponents
are revealed as the instigators and practitioners of
violence if it occurs. Then public support is magnetically
attracted to the advocates of nonviolence.”11 To facilitate
publicity, each day of the campaign was to begin with a
press briefing to explain what SCLC was doing and why.
Andrew Young, one of King’s top lieutenants in SCLC who had
previous experience working in television, had impressed
upon King the need to compress the message into sixty
seconds for television. Young figured the networks would
allow for two to three minutes for a civil rights story on
the evening news, and they needed desperately to make good
use of that time.12 As Young recalled, “That sixty seconds
was what we were demonstrating for-that sixty second message
to the world.”13
By May of 1962, at a SCLC board meeting, an idea was
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developed to build a campaign in Birmingham. Word of these
preparations leaked into the press, resulting in a major
change in attitude by the merchants in Birmingham.14 They
realized that something must be done to avoid massive
protest, and for a short time, it appeared that Birmingham
could heal itself without the need for protest. However, by
September 1962, by the time the annual SCLC convention
concluded, the situation had reverted to the old ways.
Movement leaders realized that a massive protest effort
would be needed.15
Meanwhile secret preparations continued. In
December 1962, King and his staff and circle of trusted
comrades discussed questions of exact timing, focus, and
various logistical matters. The entire project was coded to
insure communication and security. The project itself,
“project C” was soon finalized. Chillingly, King felt that
not all of the participants would survive the campaign.16
If the focus in Albany had been too imprecise, then the
goals in Birmingham would have to be more focused. It was
14
15

King, Why We Can’t Wait, 52.
Ibid., 54.

45

decided that the downtown merchants would be most
influential in dropping segregation if they stood to lose
black business.

Boycotting would be the strongest initial

weapon. So a boycott of downtown stores for the Easter
shopping season was the first step. These would begin in
early March, and six weeks would give ample time to effect
some changes and hopefully force the city to negotiate.
While this was happening, King would be fund raising from
other civil rights groups and SCLC affiliates.17
King moved into his headquarters at the Gaston Motel in
Birmingham in January 1963. Much of his initial time was
spent persuading the local black upper class to get behind
him. Conservative by nature, the upper class was miffed that
they were not consulted on what they saw as an invasion of
their city. Garnering support of the Black elite was a
formidable task.
Working class Blacks also had to be persuaded. Blacks
in Birmingham had been lashed down under the brutal forces
of segregation and poverty for so long that it would be
difficult to motivate them to engage in demonstrative
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action. SCLC brought in seasoned activists like C.T. Vivian,
Andrew Young, James Lawson, Bernard Lee, and James Bevel to
hold workshops and try and stir up interest. Meanwhile,
Dorothy Cotton led the effort to mobilize demonstrators,
provide timetables, lists of participants, and overall
guidance.18 Momentum was lost before the campaign even
began. Birmingham had changed from a city commission system
to a mayor-council government in 1962, and a special mayoral
election was slated for March 5, 1963. Because they did not
want to inadvertently help Bull Connor win the office of
mayor, demonstrations were pushed back until after the
election. Undoubtedly, Connor could harm blacks in
Birmingham more from the mayor’s office than as police
commissioner, thus everything was postponed for two weeks.19
Once again however, the timetable was interrupted when no
candidate won a majority, and a runoff election was
scheduled April 3. In that election, Albert Boutwell
defeated Bull Connor.20
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While King did prefer Boutwell to Connor, he turned
down a proposal from the new mayor to postpone
demonstrations to allow the new city government to show
good faith by bringing in some needed changes. Although
segregation was deeply entrenched in Birmingham, Connor’s
style of outlandish and brutish behavior was not looked upon
favorably in powerful circles in the city. To further muddy
the waters, the existing regime, headed by Connor and
incumbent mayor Arthur Hanes, said they would continue to
serve until their terms expired in 1965. While they were
expected to lose their court case, it would be at least
April 15 before the situation was resolved. SCLC decided to
proceed on April 3.21
On April 3, King laid out SCLC’s six-point plan for the
city. The list was hardly radical: desegregate lunch
counters and other public facilities, fair hiring practices
by stores and the city, all charges against demonstrators
dropped, desegregation of public recreational facilities,
and to form a biracial commission to study further
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integration.22 These demands did not seem unreasonable, even
in Birmingham, but unless the campaign evoked enough
reaction to have any political clout, the city probably
would not change. That same day, the first wave of protests
came in the form of sit-ins at lunch counters, the end
result being the arrest of all the protesters.23 SCLC had
held the first mass meeting two nights before on April 4.
King asked for protest volunteers and told those who
volunteered to not bring weapons to any demonstration, and
he outlined nonviolent resistance to impart the importance
of not instigating pitched battle with the police.24
Sessions were soon developed to train the volunteers to
accept the abuse that would come. They were trained, “to
resist without bitterness; to be cursed and not reply; to be
beaten and not hit back.”25
Connor seemed to have taken notes from his colleague in
Albany, Laurie Prichett, and was handling the demonstrators
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gently, and even when 42 were arrested during a march to
city hall on April 6, they were treated with, “amazing
politeness.”26 Easter was only a few days off and the
possibility of economic pressure was almost nil, and there
had not been any massive participation by the Black
population. SCLC tried to hold nightly rallies to raise
emotions and find new demonstrators, and these continued
even after the campaign picked up momentum. However, rallies
were not enough. By the end of the first week in Birmingham,
SCLC had nothing at all to show for its meticulous
preparation. Having spurned the new mayor’s good faith
gesture, and lost out on the holiday boycott, they were now
seen as outside agitators, and a number of local black
leaders seemed to agree.27 To add to the headaches, weapons
had been found among some of the demonstrators, and they
needed to be reminded of the basic principles of
nonviolence.
Nonetheless, the campaign began to slowly but surely
pick up speed. The crowds did grow at the rallies and by
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the second week, beginning April 10th, the jails began to
become even more crowded. On that same day, State Judge
William A. Jenkins signed a court order banning further
demonstrations. In the order, the judge prohibited 133
people specifically from protesting, with King at the top of
the list.28 This was a difficult decision for King. To obey
the court order would be to surrender, but to go to jail,
especially when SCLC was out of funds to provide bail on
Easter weekend was a torturous predicament. Especially
galling was at the mass meeting the next night, only 50
people signed pledge cards to go to jail with King.29
All of this pressure caused the Birmingham campaign to
come to an abrupt halt. The city government’s injunction
against further protesting said the movement was ordered to,
“cease activities until (their) right to demonstrate has
been argued in court.”30 The decision was made to disregard
the court order, because, as King told the press, “the
courts of Alabama had misused the judicial process in order
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to perpetuate injustice and segregation.”31 After King
concluded his press conference, he decided that he would
prove his point by going to jail on Good Friday and
hopefully regain the lost momentum.
On the day before Good Friday, about two dozen of the
campaign leaders met at the Gaston Motel to weigh their
options. After deliberating for a long time, most especially
over the issues of raising bail money with their most able
fund raiser behind bars and missing Easter Sunday at their
respective churches, King retired to his room and changed
into work clothes, reemerged, and announced that he was
going to defy the injunction. For the planned protest the
next day, the usually punctual Wyatt T. Walker tried a new
strategy. He had noticed that the accounts of the marches in
the press invariably lumped black observers with the
demonstrators, and so for the big march on Good Friday, he
waited to allow the crowd to build. The results of playing
on the anticipation of the King-Connor showdown came to
fruition the next day in The New York Times when it was
reported that, “more than a thousand shouting, singing

31

Ibid., 71.
52

negroes had joined the demonstration.”32 King and Abernathy
were leading the march, and when they crossed from
Seventeenth Street onto Fifth Avenue, a police motorcycle
stopped them.33 The two leaders knelt down to pray, and
Connor gave the arrest order, and about four dozen were
taken to jail.34
An extremely busy Wyatt T. Walker sent a telegram to
President Kennedy. He told the President:
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and the Rev. Ralph B
Abernathy are presently confined to the Birmingham city
jail. Both were arrested…in violation of the
constitutional guarantees of the first and fourteenth
amendments…We submit that these two distinguished
Americans are political prisoners and not criminals. We
ask that you use your high office to persuade the city
officials of Birmingham to afford at least a modicum of
human treatment.35
King would remain in solitary confinement for a day.
King could not call his wife or visit lawyers during this
time. Coretta Scott King did call the President, and
Attorney General Robert Kennedy called her back, assuring
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her that King would be fine. The President called and
assured Coretta that he was looking into the matter.36
King was isolated and depressed in the jail, but the
next day, one of his New York attorneys Clarence Jones
arrived to inform King that Harry Belafonte had raised
$50,000 in bail money.37 King was overjoyed but was less so
at an item that appeared in that day’s Birmingham News,
which carried an “Appeal for Law and Order and Common Sense”
signed by eight prominent white Christian and Jewish clergy.
It criticized the timing of the campaign and raised the old
southern refrain of ‘outside agitators’ ruining good race
relations. Taking his attention away from the more pressing
problems at hand, King, using newspaper edges and a pen
smuggled into his cell, composed a reply.38 All of King’s
beliefs and philosophy were about to be crystallized into
one single piece of writing. In his “Letter From Birmingham
Jail” King denied that he was an outsider. All communities,
he argued, are interrelated. “I cannot sit idly by in
Atlanta and not be concerned about what happens in
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Birmingham. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere. We are caught in a inescapable network of
mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny.”39 King went
on to answer criticism of the demonstrations, wondering why
they had so much concern for the manifestations of
discontent, but not the causes. He went through the four
stages of nonviolence, as well as Thomas Aquinas’ theory on
just and unjust law. Basically what this theory holds that
just because a law was passed does not mean that the law is
always just. Civil disobedience, therefore, was right
because it was in protest of an unjust law.40 King ended his
letter with an admonition to the white clergy to keep their
churches relevant and respond to the challenges of justice.
The destiny of his people, he claimed, was, “tied up with
America’s destiny.”41 The letter did not spring quickly to
acclaim. Not a single mention of it appeared the press for
about a month. So, while it may seem that King saved his
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campaign with his pen, the reverse is actually true. The
movement caught fire and saved the Letter from oblivion.42
And on April 20th after eight days in jail, King was
released.
Quickly, the SCLC staff convened to plan more
demonstrations with a new strategy. Youth had been less
involved in this campaign than in others, and some of the
leadership pushed to have young people, high school students
and younger, included in marches planned for early May.
King, while harboring misgivings about using children, felt
that they had never known freedom, but did know segregation.
The use of children had a dramatic effect on the whole
campaign, and, as a result, the whole nation. James Bevel
and the other youth recruiters had amassed a nonviolent army
of about 6,000 young people ready to march.43
On May 2, “D-Day”, the most intense portion of the
campaign was launched. The children emerged from the 16th
Street Baptist Church and marched into downtown Birmingham.
When they met Connor and his men, they all were arrested. It
was reported that, “they scampered almost merrily into the
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paddy wagons.”44 On that first day of demonstrations, Walker
announced that of the 958 children to sign pledge cards to
go to jail, 600 were in custody. At the mass meetings that
evening, emotions reached a fevered pitch, and 300 more
people announced themselves ready to go to jail.45
It was during the “D-Day” demonstrations that one of
the more infamous and shocking displays in the history of
the United States occurred, and it may be this week that
changed the course of history. The next day, to help control
the demonstrators, Bull Connor had fire hoses and German
Shepherd dogs to try and intimidate the crowd. When the
threat of intimidation failed to work, he ordered the hoses
to spray on the marchers.46 With the hoses literally
knocking people down and then forcing them back, Connor lost
any moral ground that he had and, therefore, lost the war
for public opinion. This also caused all dissent about the
need for the campaign itself to evaporate. Hard on the heels
of absorbing the fact that over one thousand Black children
43
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had marched to jail in the previous two days, now the nation
was treated to images of fire hoses and dogs being used to
stop a people merely asking for the same rights that most of
America took for granted. As the dogs were let loose on the
marchers, Connor told his men, “Look at them run…I want them
to see the dogs work. Look at those niggers run.”47
As for the K-9 units, an AP photographer caught the
image of a dog with its mouth around a young black boy’s
abdomen, while on his face is dead calm and he seems to be
leaning into the attacking dog. The boy, Walter Gadsden, was
not trained in nonviolence and did not intend to be in the
demonstration, his reaction crystallized for the nation who
was right and who was wrong in the matter of Birmingham.48
For many bystanders, this was all too much. Soon,
hundreds of Blacks not trained in nonviolence began to fight
back. The fire hoses were used again, and more Blacks joined
the melee. Finally James Bevel offered a deal to the police.
He would try and disperse the Blacks if they would stop
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their brutal crowd control tactics. Bevel’s gamble worked
and the near riot was over.49
In Washington, President Kennedy watched the events
unfold on television with deep interest. On May 4th, he
dispatched Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall to
the city to try and find resolution. His job was not to
propose solutions, but to represent the President in any and
all negotiations.50 King interpreted this as evidence that
the political pressure he wanted to exert in Washington was
beginning to pay off. Marshall succeeded, and soon meetings
were being held between the city and SCLC. These meetings
would lead to the negotiations that would bring about the
end of the campaign.
However, before negotiations could be completed, more
violence erupted. Groups of Blacks, not officially part of
the Movement, attacked Connor and his men with bottles and
rocks. Connor responded with high-pressure fire hoses
mounted on tripods like machine guns.51 The police at this
time requested state troops to intervene.
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On May 7, during a break in the negotiations, white
businessmen leaving the meeting encountered several thousand
Blacks protesting outside. By this time, “the jails were so
full that police could only arrest a handful.”52
Demonstrations continued until May 9th, when 2,000
people were in jail and the downtown business district was
thronged with a seemingly endless mass of protesters.
It was at this point that the state of Alabama realized that
it was at a breaking point. Jails were full, budgets for the
year had already been spent, street officers were stressed
to the point of cracking, ever present news cameras were
only adding to that stress, and a divided city leadership,
so something obviously needed to be done.53
On May 8, President Kennedy held a press conference. In
his opening remarks, the President discussed the situation
in Alabama and told the assembled reporters that he would
try and use all the power at his disposal to protect the
citizens of America and uphold the law. He went on to say:
We can hope that tensions will ease and that this case
history…will remind every state, every community and
51
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every citizen how urgent it is that all bars to equal
opportunity…be removed as quickly as possible.54
Thanks to around-the-clock negotiations between May 79, a compromise settlement had been reached. With Connor’s
forces bolstered by 250 state troops, and with 800 more in
reserve, it looked as though major bloodshed had been
narrowly averted.55
King saw the agreement as a positive one. He titled the
final chapter of his book Why We Can’t Wait “Black and White
Together” and it reflected his optimism of that agreement.
In that book, King says that, “Birmingham may well offer
twentieth century America an example of progressive racial
relations, for all mankind a dawn of a new day, a promise
for all men, a day of opportunity and a new sense of freedom
for all America.”56
The agreement called for the integration of lunch
counters, restrooms, and drinking fountains within
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ninety days. There was also a call to end racial
discrimination in hiring practices, and the biracial
commission that King called for would be established. Also,
all of the protesters in jail would be freed, either on bail
or released on their own recognizance.57
If the Birmingham agreement is measured by substance
and viability, King was mistaken in its effectiveness. The
settlement had little standing because it was made
privately, with almost no involvement from the city. Also,
the announcement had hardly been made when violence erupted
in the city. Governor George Wallace and the city government
both rejected the agreement.58
On May 10th two explosives were thrown from a car,
damaged the Gaston Motel where King was staying. One bomb
exploded by the registration desk, and the other destroyed a
trailer nearby.59

The home of A.D. King, Martin’s brother,

was also firebombed. The house sustained partial damage, but
no one was hurt in either incident.60 However, in response,
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a black mob was formed with thousands of Blacks not trained
in nonviolence. After the bombings, these people filled the
streets and started hurling rocks at the police.61 To
restore order, the police brought in the K-9 units, which
incited the crowd further. The dogs were taken away, and the
police tried peaceful negotiation. As this was going on,
several fires broke out. Thirty-five state troopers were
brought in armed with guns and billy clubs. They waded into
the mob, and by 4:30 A.M. the crowd had been dispersed.62
In retaliation for these outbursts, on May 20 outgoing
Mayor Hanes expelled 1,000 black students from the city
schools for participating in the riots.63 With help from the
NAACP Legal Defense fund, the decision was overturned.
The situation was deteriorating so badly that President
Kennedy ordered federal troops be sent to Alabama. Governor
Wallace decried Kennedy’s action, and announced that he
planned to file a motion in federal court to have the troops
removed. Kennedy responded that under the law it was the
President’s duty to suppress any action in any state that
61
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could potentially harm the citizens of that state.64 Kennedy
had the troops stationed in Anniston and in Montgomery, and
let Wallace know that they could be dispatched into
Birmingham if need be. This calmed the more violent
protests.
On May 18th, President Kennedy spoke at Vanderbilt
University in Nashville in support of the rights of Black
Americans. And a few weeks later on June 11, Kennedy, in a
nationally televised address, made clear how he felt about
the Civil Rights Movement:
We preach freedom around the world and we mean it. And
we cherish our freedom here at home. But are we to say
to the world-and much more importantly-to each other,
that this is the land of the free…except for Negroes;
that we have no second class citizens…except for
Negroes; that we have no class or caste system no
ghettoes, no master race… except with respect to
Negroes? Now the time has come for the nation to
fulfill its promise. The events of Birmingham and
elsewhere have so increased the cries for equality that
no city or state legislative body can prudently choose
to ignore them.65
While some criticized Kennedy for not delivering this
speech earlier, that was ignoring the fact that SCLC’s
63
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Birmingham campaign had, in Schlesinger’s words, “…given him
the nation’s ear.”66
Eight days later, Kennedy sent his long-promised Civil
Rights Bill to Congress, marking the beginning of the epic
battle that would end with the passing of the Civil Rights
Bill of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
In the face of the Kennedy Administration finally
sending a comprehensive Civil Rights Bill to the floor of
Congress, the Birmingham campaign was a success. King wanted
to use the stage of Birmingham to set a fire under the
conscience of the nation, and in that he succeeded. King
successfully used the philosophy of nonviolence to bring
public exposure of injustice, and then used the prevailing
firestorm of public criticism of his opponent to tear down
one more bastion of integration.
To keep up the pressure, civil rights leaders were
preparing for the March on Washington to attempt to bring
their own pressure on Congress to pass the Civil Rights
Bill. In covering the March on Washington for CBS News, an
obviously sympathetic Roger Mudd lamented on the air that
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the votes just were not there and the bill would not pass.67
As for the march itself, all of the major civil rights
organizations participated, and on August 28, 1963, over
250,000 people descended on Washington D.C.68
At the Lincoln Memorial, several speeches were given.
The two that were most notable were the ones by John Lewis
and Martin Luther King. In his speech, Lewis attacked the
Administration for a lack of action on civil rights and
promised violence if steps were not taken. This further
demonstrated the rift between SCLC and SNCC, as Lewis was
chairman of the students. King’s speech of course galvanized
the world, and is perhaps one of the best orations in
history, the “I Have a Dream” speech.
In September, the tensions in Birmingham had still not
entirely dissipated. Schools were finally desegregated, but
violence still seemed to be looming. During the first week
of school there were no incidents. Then came the weekend. On
Sunday morning, September 15, a bomb exploded inside the
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16th Street Baptist Church.69 The explosion was very
powerful, as, “…great chunks of stone shot through parked
cars. The blast shattered the windshield of a passing car
and knocked the driver unconscious.”70 When church members
were clearing the debris, they stumbled across the bodies of
four young girls. The four had been in the bathroom when the
bomb exploded, and they were killed almost instantly.71 When
the police arrived, they were immediately confronted by an
angry mob who began to pelt them with rocks. The police
fired over the heads of the crowd. Some youths were throwing
stones at passing cars, and when ordered to stop, one of
them, Johnny Robinson, began to run. He was shot and
killed.72 Across town, two white youths killed a Black
teenager, and violence continued to erupt throughout the
night. By the time Sunday came to a conclusion, six people
were dead, scores were injured, and there was rampant
destruction across the city.
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Mayor Boutwell asked Governor Wallace for help, and
Wallace dispatched Col. Al Lingo and a company of the
Alabama National Guard into the city. Tensions cooled by the
end of the year, however, and there were no major incidents
of violence.
That may be due to that infamous November day when
Kennedy was killed in Dallas. Suddenly the whole nation was
thrown into a state of disbelief.
Suddenly, in the wake of Kennedy’s death, the votes
were there in Congress for President Lyndon Johnson to pass
a Civil Rights Bill, and by March of 1964 the nation tuned
in to see once again CBS correspondent Roger Mudd. The civil
rights bill had passed the House and was in the Senate.
Southern opponents were preparing for a filibuster, and CBS
decided that Roger Mudd would provide saturation coverage of
the move, guaranteeing that the story would be on television
every night as long as the filibuster lasted.73 The debate
began in late March and lasted until the middle of June.
Mudd averaged five television pieces per day, and by the
time the bill was passed, he had done 867 stories on it.74
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Birmingham became the model on how to conduct a civil
rights campaign. While the local objectives were not
completed, it was this campaign that applied the necessary
pressure on the Administration to pass the Civil Rights Act
in 1964.75 So, as the Movement headed into 1964 and
Mississippi Freedom Summer, King took a much needed break
and began to plan for the next campaign: voting rights.
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CHAPTER 4
AIN’T GONNA LET NO ONE TURN ME ROUND

After a hectic schedule of travel for most of 1964,
King and SCLC decided to focus on voting rights, and the
city of Selma, Alabama, offered a good chance for success.
In 1960, the Dallas County Voting League was established to
register Black votes, but by 1964 only three percent of the
Black population were registered voters, while White
registration exceeded one hundred percent, a figure achieved
by registering the deceased.1

In 1963, SNCC had implemented

a project in Selma but was largely unsuccessful in their
voting registration attempts, such as a 1964 voting rights
march that resulted in widespread arrests of the
demonstrators. After several years of government litigation
and the best efforts of SNCC, only 353 or 2.1 percent of
eligible black voters in Dallas County were registered.2 At
that rate, King noted, “…it would take 103 years to register
the adult Negroes.”3

In response, State Judge James Hare
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issued a sweeping injunction prohibiting discussion of
racial issues at any gathering of three or more people.4 One
civil rights worker described the situation saying, “Selma
is in a state of siege. Everywhere you look you see state
policemen brandishing clubs and cattle prods.”5
In determining what to focus on after Birmingham and
the passage of the Civil Rights Bill, SCLC concluded that
because focusing on public accommodations had won the Civil
Rights Act, then focusing on voting rights might help the
movement ratify similar legislation. While Selma did not
meet many of SCLC’s requirements because it was isolated and
small, King nevertheless was impressed with the level of
dedication of the citizens there. Andrew Young said that,
“more people were committed to the movement before Martin’s
arrival than after months of organizing and two weeks of
demonstrations in Birmingham.”6
In trying to decide how to best proceed in moving
forward on the voting rights issue, SCLC board member C.T.
Vivian reminded campaign organizers that, “We must have a
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rallying point around which we can stir the whole nation.”7
SCLC found the answer in Dallas County Sheriff Jim Clark.
Clark was a die-hard segregationist in the Bull Connor mold
and was anticipated to react in a similar hostile manner to
direct action protests, resulting in the beatings and
jailings that would lead to the eventual success of the
campaign.8 In fact, Clark was so integral to the plan that
one staffer joked that he should be put on the payroll.9
King and the rest of the SCLC staff arrived in Selma on
January 2, 1965. In his first act upon arrival, King gave
his “Give Us the Ballot” speech before a filled congregation
at Brown Chapel. The packed audience was an indication that
the people of Selma were ready for confrontation. As King
concluded his speech, he noted that Selma was, “a symbol of
bitter resistance to the Civil Rights Movement in the Deep
South.”10
By Tuesday January 12, SNCC and SCLC were working
feverishly to train and coordinate the volunteers to work
the voting wards and attempt to register voters. Two nights
7
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later, once again at Brown Chapel, King was drowned out by
cheering as he pledged to, “be coming back again, and again,
and again until…”11 He declared that the planned campaign
called for registration drives in ten surrounding counties,
and on the next Monday three things were going to happen.
There would be a march through Selma to the courthouse,
along with sending volunteers to apply for Whites-only jobs.
Teams would also be sent out to try and desegregate hotels
and restaurants under the civil rights law.12 King declared
that Monday would be Freedom Day. Over the weekend Andrew
Young met with police chief Wilson Baker. Baker was the
chief of police for the city of Selma, while the more
dangerous Clark controlled the county. Baker assured Young
that on Monday the law would be enforced professionally.13
That Monday, January 18, the first skirmish occurred. King
led a group of about three hundred out of Brown Chapel to
the courthouse. About a block from the church the march was
stopped by Baker, where the marchers were given notice about
the pedestrian traffic laws and warned that unless the
marchers dissolved into groups of five or fewer at intervals
10
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of ten feet they would be arrested. The marchers complied,
and in this fashion continued to march to the courthouse,
where they were confronted by Sheriff Clark. He escorted the
marchers into the courthouse, past the registrar’s office,
and herded them back onto the street.14 The integration of
public accommodations went well, as workers attempted to
desegregate restaurants, hotels, and other public
establishments, there was no incident with local law
enforcement. The SCLC feared that with no violence to cover,
journalists would begin to leave and the movement’s ability
to place pressure on Washington would be greatly reduced.
Something dramatic needed to happen or the movement would
more than likely lose momentum.
Sheriff Clark had been quiet up to this point, but he
could only be restrained for so long. During the march on
January 19, he reacted. In an attempt to break up a SNCCSCLC march to the county courthouse, he ordered the crowd to
disperse. When the crowd failed to do so, Clark grabbed a
Black woman, Amelia Boynton, shoved her and placed her under
arrest. About sixty people witnessed the incident and
refused to leave, and Clark had them arrested as well.15
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Unfortunately for him, a photograph of the incident appeared
the next day in the pages of both the New York Times and the
Washington Post, showing Clark with his billy club raised
over her head.16

More confrontations occurred in late

January. On January 20, three groups of would-be voters were
arrested by Clark for obstructing the sidewalk, and two days
later, more than one hundred school teachers were arrested
protesting Boynton’s arrest.17
On February 2, King led 250 marchers to the courthouse
to protest the slowness of black voter registration, and
upon arrival all of them were arrested by Public Safety
Commissioner Wilson Baker. Baker personally arrested King to
avoid the possible violence if the job was left to Clark.
Upon hearing of King’s arrest, over five hundred children
marched to the courthouse and were also arrested.18 Along
with King, there were nearly eight hundred people in jail.
Having the most recent recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in
jail attracted media attention from all around the world and
dramatically raised Selma into the consciousness of the
Years 1954-1965. (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 259.
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larger world.19 In addition, SCLC organized a group of
fifteen concerned Congressmen, led by John Conyers and
Charles Diggs from Detroit, to come to Selma to see what was
happening. Accompanying the group was Assistant Attorney
General Ramsey Clark, who confided to Andrew Young that the
administration felt that it would not be possible to pass a
voting rights bill at that time.20
While King was in jail, the fiery Black Muslim leader
Malcolm X arrived in Selma on February 3, appearing at the
invitation of SNCC. Malcolm X, who would be killed in New
York eighteen days later, gave a passionate speech in which
he advocated meeting violence with violence, saying, “…the
white people should thank Dr. King for holding people in
check, for there are others who do not believe in these
[nonviolent] measures.”21 However, in a private conversation
with Coretta Scott King, Malcolm X assured her that he was
trying to help the movement by showing America that if
King’s way was not accepted, his was the alternative.22
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That same day, President Johnson commented on Selma
publicly for the first time. In his speech, the President
said, “The loss of that [voting] right to a single citizen
undermines the freedom of every citizen…I intend to see that
that right is secured for every citizen.”23
The Movement was also somewhat anxious due to a new
decree from U.S. District Judge Daniel Thomas. Thomas ruled
that the Alabama literacy test for voting eligibility be
suspended, ordered Selma to take at least one hundred
applicants per registration day, and guaranteed that all
applications received by June 1 would be processed before
July.24 King was skeptical but exhorted Young to continue
marching to keep up the pressure.
On February 5, King was released from jail. That day,
his “Letter From a Selma Jail” appeared in the New York
Times, where King wryly noted that there were more Blacks in
jail in Selma than there were on the voter rolls.25 The very
next day, in Washington, Press Secretary George Reedy
disclosed the Johnson Administration’s intent to “strongly
recommend” voting rights legislation before the end of the
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year.26 On February 9, King flew to Washington to lobby
further for a voting rights bill. During his visit, the
Johnson Administration took great pains to assure King that
the bill was beginning to move. King believed both VicePresident Hubert Humpherey and Attorney General Nicholas
Katzenbach, but he felt that the events in Alabama were
unfolding too quickly, and the bill was moving too slowly.27
King was right. In a rally at the courthouse in Selma
on February 15, C.T. Vivian, who was leading the march,
began comparing Sheriff Clark to Hitler, and while
continuing to taunt him was suddenly struck in the face.
Film of the incident made for what one commentator called,
“vivid television.”28 Clark, while not recalling if he had
in fact struck Vivian or not, later noted, “I lost my
temper.”29 One SCLC staffer told the press that every time
the movement in Selma seemed to be dying out, Sheriff Clark
would come to the rescue.
Vivian was invited to speak in the nearby town of
Marion on February 18 about his confrontation with Clark.
The meeting ended with a nighttime march, a dangerous
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activity. The area was almost completely surrounded by
police and angry white civilians. As the attack commenced,
the streetlights went out. An eighty-two year old man, Cager
Lee, had been severely beaten and was bleeding. His
grandson, Jimmie Lee Jackson, a Vietnam veteran, rushed him
to a café, and was trying to protect Lee and his mother. A
policeman entered and a scuffle broke out. In the melee,
Jackson’s mother was hit, and Jackson was hit in the face
with a nightstick and shot in the stomach.30 Several other
people were injured, including an NBC correspondent. This
latest incident brought renewed national coverage into the
campaign but seemed to take an emotional toll on the
movement. To add to the sorrow, three days later Malcolm X
was assassinated in New York.
On Tuesday, February 23 in Washington, thirty-nine
Republican leaders criticized the Johnson Administration for
lacking focus on the civil rights issue. Jimmie Lee Jackson
died that Friday, and unbeknownst to the Movement leaders,
this was the catalyst for the climax of the Selma campaign.
That Sunday, two days after the death of Jackson,
SCLC’S James Bevel suggested in a sermon that the campaign
should be brought to Governor Wallace. He proposed a march
29
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from Marion, the site of the shooting, to Montgomery. On
Wednesday March 3, King delivered the eulogy for Jimmie Lee
Jackson at Brown Chapel in Selma. In the course of his
remarks, King promised the slain Jackson, “We will bring a
voting bill into being on the streets of Selma.”31
Meanwhile Governor Wallace began to attempt to stop any
march by any means necessary. At a press conference, he
announced that the state would prohibit the march, as it
would tie up traffic on Route 80, and he put the highway
patrol on alert.32
However, at this point the rift between SNCC and SCLC
that started in Albany began to surface again. SNCC
officials were not convinced that the march would be of any
value. They feared both people being hurt and SCLC staging
the march and then leaving town with nothing accomplished
but more publicity for King. However, John Lewis and three
other members of the Board of Directors elected to march as
individuals. SNCC preferred to intensify the campaign around
Selma, but the SCLC decided that the value of campaigning in
the small town had been exhausted and decided something more
dramatic was needed to focus attention on voting rights. It
30
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was reasoned that the whole Alabama project had begun as a
plan to get rid of George Wallace, so it seemed to make
sense to take the campaign to Montgomery and put the
spotlight on the Governor.
Early on Sunday March 7, the day of the march, King
called Andrew Young and instructed him to postpone the march
until Monday.33 King was tied up in Atlanta with other
obligations and was uncomfortable not being there in case
something went wrong. However, when Young arrived in Selma
to relay the order, there were already about 500 people
waiting to depart. Young decided that the massed police he
had seen on the way into Selma would stop the march, and
there would then be time to really do it later without SCLC
losing any of the momentum.34 Young called King in Atlanta
and appraised him of the situation. King reluctantly agreed
to let the march take place but insisted that of his top
four people in Selma, only two needed to go. King wanted at
least two men from the leadership to stay behind in case
anything went wrong.35

So, the 500 marchers met and left

for the fifty-five mile trek to Montgomery. The marchers,
led by SCLC lieutenant Hosea Williams and John Lewis of
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SNCC, began to walk down Highway 80. As the marchers reached
the Edmund Pettus Bridge, they were met by Alabama law
enforcement personnel who were blocking the way. The
marchers were ordered to disperse by Major John Cloud, head
of the state police. He gave them three minutes, and after
one and a half minutes, the marchers were advanced upon by
the police. They were pushed back with tear gas, night
sticks, men on horseback, and sheer brute force. The day
became known as “Bloody Sunday,” the single most brutal day
of repression in the history of the Civil Rights Movement.
Television cameras were on hand to record the event, and ABC
News cut into the Sunday Night Movie, which ironically was
about anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany, Judgement at Nuremberg,
to show the viewers the carnage in Alabama.36 When the day
was over, John Lewis suffered a fractured skull, seventeen
other demonstrators were hospitalized for injuries, and
another forty marchers were treated for their injuries and
then released.37 In the wake of the violence and his split
skull, John Lewis said, “I don’t see how President Johnson
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can send troops to Vietnam…and can’t send troops to Selma,
Alabama.”38
This was almost too much for the country to bear. In
Congress, Minnesota Senator Walter Mondale declared that the
latest act of violence made passing of the voting rights act
imperative. In Montgomery, an angry Governor Wallace
viciously criticized Clark in private for letting the
situation spiral to such extremes,39 but, to the public,
Wallace downplayed what happened, saying that the incident,
“should make it evident to the Negro people …that King and
other leaders who ask them to break the law are always
absent from the violence as he was today.”40
King would not back down. SCLC planned another march
for the following Tuesday, but that morning in federal
court, Judge Frank Johnson prohibited the day’s march until
a Thursday hearing on a motion made by SCLC to forbid
Governor Wallace from interfering with the planned march. To
make matters worse, SCLC and SNCC were at odds over tactics.
This time, SNCC was all for the march, and King was well
aware of the antagonism to the presence of SCLC in what had
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begun as a SNCC campaign. So, blocked by a federal court
order, as well as a public exhortation by the President of
the United States urging delaying of the march King had to
make a decision. Despite all that was arrayed against the
idea of the march, King decided to proceed anyway. People
from all over the country had come to Selma in a show of
support, and SCLC could not waver, nor could they risk a
public disagreement with SNCC.
So, on March 9, King and about 900 marchers set off
again. Soon, the march grew to about 1,500. However, the
enthusiasm generated by the march, the cries of, “ain’t
gonna let no one turn me round!”41 were soon extinguished.
As the marchers once again reached the Edmund Pettus Bridge,
they were once again ordered to stop by Major Cloud. In
response, King knelt and asked Ralph Abernathy to lead the
crowd in prayer. When Abernathy concluded, King rose and
began to walk back into Selma.42 Activists were livid. They
felt that something was wrong, and SNCC accused King of
making a secret agreement with the federal government. King
defended his action by saying he was planning to proceed
with the march, but that when he learned that police
violence was once again imminent the march would stop,
41
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“having made our point, revealing the continued presence of
violence…hoping, finally that the national administration in
Washington would feel and respond.”43
However, in the court hearing Thursday, King was forced
to reveal that by a tacit agreement made that fateful
morning, King had agreed to stop the march and go back to
Selma. This would allow for no violence and room for further
dialogue.
However, violence did occur in the aftermath of the
aborted march. Three Unitarian ministers were beaten, one of
them, James Reeb, fatally, and the Ku Klux Klan were blamed.
Unlike the earlier death of Jimmie Lee Jackson, Reeb’s death
made national headlines and once again inspired a national
outrage. This irony was not lost to those on the movement.
Stokely Carmichael pointed out, “…what you want is the
nation to be upset when anybody is killed…it’s almost for
this to be recognized, a white person must be killed. What
does that say?”44
In the wake of the death of Reeb, President Johnson was
eager to act. With the spectacle of segregationist violence
in the forefront of national attention, the President felt
confident he could pass the voting rights bill and finish
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the “second reconstruction.”

That Saturday Governor Wallace

flew to Washington to confer with President Johnson.

After

a nonproductive meeting, during which Wallace tried to say
that it was the demonstrators that were the real problem in
Alabama, Johnson became angry. Wallace, however, did give
Johnson the excuse he needed to intervene by claiming the
state of Alabama did not have the resources to protect the
marchers. That was all Johnson needed, so he charmed the
Alabama Governor for a few minutes and then he escorted
Wallace out. Wallace said later, “If I hadn’t left when I
did, he’d have had me coming out for civil rights.”45 The
President then went to the Rose Garden, where he delivered
his first press conference since “Bloody Sunday.” In his
remarks, he commented that, “…the nation had witnessed a
very deep and painful challenge to the unending search for
American freedom,” and went on to say that those events,
“highlighted a deep and very unjust flaw in American
democracy.”46 As he concluded, the now riled up President
went to the office of Attorney General Katzenbach and told
him to, “…write the god-damndest toughest voting rights act
44
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that you can think of.”47
The following Monday President Johnson addressed a
special joint session of Congress. It was the first time in
19 years a president had specifically addressed Congress on
a domestic issue. On national television, to an audience of
seventy million, Johnson stated his beliefs in some stirring
words. After placing Selma alongside Lexington and Concord
and Appomattox as turning points in “man’s unending search
for freedom,” Johnson went on:
What happened in Selma is part of a far larger movement
which reaches into every section and state of America.
It is the effort of the American Negro to secure for
themselves the full blessings of American life.48
It was a stirring display of rhetoric and, along with
the outrage over Selma, almost assured that the voting
rights legislation would pass. David Lewis wrote that, “No
President had ever spoken so feelingly of the overdue rights
of the American Black or more unequivocally…than Lyndon
Johnson.”49
Two days later on the 16th, Judge Frank Johnson heard
arguments for the long delayed Selma to Montgomery march.
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During the hearing, SCLC tried to make it clear that they
were expanding every effort to prepare an orderly and
nonviolent march to the capital. Two days later, Judge
Johnson authorized the long-awaited Selma to Montgomery
march and explicitly ordered Governor Wallace not to
interfere. He allowed SCLC as many marchers as they wished
on the four lane portions of Highway 80 but limited them to
300 marchers on the portions of the highway that were two
lane. Later on that same day, Johnson finally sent his
voting rights bill to Congress.
The march began on March 21, and Wallace was completely
powerless to stop it. SCLC planned for a five-day time
schedule and set up campsites and logistical support to
accommodate the expected numbers. That day, in the glare of
the national spotlight, 3,500 people departed from Brown’s
Chapel. Leaders from every major civil rights organization
were present along with celebrities such as Ralph Bunche and
Harry Belafonte. Along the route, Alabama National Guardsman
were posted to ensure the safety of the people, and as the
first day was over, many people departed back for Selma,
including Dr. King, who had several speaking engagements
that he simply had to make.50 As the march went through its
Press. 1978), 284-285.
50
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second, third, and fourth day, the numbers dwindled until
the 300 remained as ordered by Judge Johnson. 30,000 people
participated and reached Montgomery that Thursday. In a
stirring speech on the steps of the state capitol building
broadcast live on the three national television networks,
King proclaimed that they had made it, and were there to
demonstrate, “…that here we are, standing before the forces
of power in Alabama saying, ‘We ain’t gonna let nobody turn
us ‘round.’”51
The march seemed to end on a high note, but that night,
a woman, Viola Liuzzo, was carpooling people back to Selma
and was shot through the head and killed by a carload of
Klansmen. Within hours, the FBI discovered that one of its
informants had been in the car, and by eight A.M. the next
morning the case had been solved.52 The next day on
television, President Johnson announced that the four men in
the car had been arrested, and the case was solved, as well
as issuing a condemnation of the Ku Klux Klan, whom Johnson
characterized as a threat to the peace of every community
they operated in.53
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Support for the voting rights bill increased in the
wake of the violence. The only issue that delayed speedy
passage was a debate over whether the ban on the use of the
poll tax was unconstitutional. So, the Justice Department
filed lawsuits in the four states where the poll tax was
still used, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia.54
Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia told one of his aides, “You
know, you can’t stop this bill. We can’t deny the Negro a
basic constitutional right to vote.”55
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 passed the Senate two
months after the march on May 26 by a vote of seventy-seven
to nineteen, and the House passed it after five weeks of
debate on July 9.56 Johnson signed it into law on August 6
in a ceremony in the President’s Room off the Capitol
Rotunda, in the same room where Abraham Lincoln had signed
the Emancipation Proclamation one hundred four years
earlier.57
In the summer following the passage of the Voting
Rights Act, 9,000 Blacks in Dallas County had gained the
ability to vote. Sheriff Jim Clark was voted out of office.
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“In truth,” wrote King biographer Stephen Oates, “…the
Selma Campaign was the Movement’s finest hour, was King’s
finest hour.”58 In many respects this statement is true. The
Selma Campaign applied the public pressure that
President Johnson needed to force the voting rights
legislation through Congress, and it affirmed the basic
ideals of nonviolent direct action to apply pressure for
social change. The Selma campaign, much like Birmingham, was
not a total success locally. Problems there were not
resolved by the campaign, but once again, like Birmingham,
the campaign did much to facilitate national movement.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

Author Hunter S. Thompson once wrote, “A prime
intention of any left/radical demonstration is to provoke
the minions of the establishment (the police) to violence,
and thus expose the brutality and hypocrisy of an
establishment that claims to stand for peace and
democracy.”1 While Thompson was writing in regard to the
riots at the Democratic National Convention in 1968, his
observation on the purpose of demonstrating is correct.
For the Civil Rights Movement the revolution was
televised. Beginning with the Little Rock Crisis in 1957,
almost all of the key moments of the civil rights movement
in the late fifties and early sixties were caught by
television cameras. By broadcasting what happened, these
images, some orchestrated, such as the March on Washington,
and some, like “Bloody Sunday” in Selma, totally
spontaneous, changed the perception that the United States
had of itself.
Even in the South the difference was felt. In 1955 only
twenty percent of those polled were in favor of school
1
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desegregation, but in 1964 62 percent of Southerners favored
the civil rights bill as long as it was implemented
gradually.2 This was a staggering change of heart,
especially to come about in just over a decade.
In Albany, the Civil Rights Movement suffered defeat
thanks to the tactics of Sheriff Laurie Prichett. However,
it was this failure that led to the later more successful
campaigns in Birmingham and Selma. The Albany campaign
showed King what was necessary to bring national attention
to the segregated South. He needed headlines that
demonstrated the cruelty and injustice of segregation. While
Albany in and of itself was not a victory for the movement,
it did provide the education that led to the success in
Birmingham.
The Birmingham campaign was the most important campaign
of the modern Civil Rights Movement. While the concessions
made by the city were small, it was this campaign that led
to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 Bull Connor
lost all control over the city as well as any credibility he
had when the national media caught the images and events of
the “D-Day” demonstrations. With the nation finally
understanding what the South was perpetuating with
2
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segregation, the system of depriving people their rights
very quickly eroded.
In Selma, Jim Clark endured a similar fate to that Bull
Connor had. With the debacle at the Edmund Pettus Bridge,
Selma was a lost campaign for the remnants of segregation.
Once again, the images of American citizens being beaten
while simply protesting for the rights that had already been
granted in the Constitution shocked the nation. This outrage
was enough to allow President Johnson to pass the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.4
In the early 1960s all of the key elements for success
in achieving equality for Black Americans came together.
With national media, dynamic leadership, a mass following,
and allies within the federal government all playing key
roles, Black Americans came closer to the promise of living
in a nation, “where all men are created equal.”
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